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RECENT CASES
Administrative LawPOPULATION PROVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DEFINITION OF "AREA OF PRODUCTION" UNDER
FLSA § 13(a,)10 DECLARED INVALID
Section 13 (a) 10 of the Fair Labor Standards Act withholds wage and
hour coverage from employees engaged in handling or preparing for market
raw agricultural products if the work is done within an "area of production"
as defined by the administrator.' The present formulation defines area of
production to include establishments located in the "open country" if 95%
of the crop handled is produced within a specified distance from the plant;
"open country" does not include towns of over 2500 population.2 Appellant, the operator of a cotton warehouse otherwise within the definiton but
located in a town of 6309 population, was sued by employees for minimum
and overtime wages alleged to be due under the Act.3 The Fifth Circuit
reversed judgment for the employees 4 on the ground that once the
geographic limits of the area were described further exclusions from the
area could not be made by recourse to any other conditions. Lovvorn v.
Miller, 215 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1954).
Although employers of labor excluded from wage and hour coverage
by the definition are benefited by lower labor costs, their interest is incidental to those which the section was intended to harmonize: the desire
for federal wage and hour guarantees of industrial labor handling agricultural products, and the interest of farmers in low costs of marketing the
crop. At the time the FLSA was being considered, farm interests contended that statutory wage increases in industries subsidiary to agriculture
would be passed to farmers in the form of higher charges or lower prices
and ultimately result in a lower return on the crop.5 This view 0 was sup-,
1. 52 STAT. 1067 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §213(a)10 (1952). Employees
covered by the section are those "engaged in handling, packing, storing, ginning, compressing, pasteurizing, drying, preparing in their raw or natural state, or canning . . .
agricultural . . . commodities for market, or in making cheese or butter or other
dairy products. ..

."

2. 29 CODE Fm. REas. § 536.2 (1949).
3. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 216(b) (1952); 52 STAT. 1062
(1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §206 (1952) (minimum wage provision); 52 STAT.
1063 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §207(a) (1952) (maximum hours provision).
4. The cause was remanded to the district court for disposition in accordance
with the new definition. See Note, 153 A.L.R. 1026 (1944) ; DAvis, ADMINISTRATv
LAw 214-16 (1951); Note, 35 CAiF. L. REv. 92 (1947); Note, 60 HARv. L. REV.
627 (1947).
5. 81 CONG. RZEc. 7656, 7877, 7880 (1937) ; 83 CONG. REc. 7401 (1938) ; Messenger
v. Traders Compress Co., 107 F. Supp. 354, 359 (E.D. Okla. 1951).
6. This was the chief basis for the exemption; other considerations are indicated
in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 628 n.8 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
(678)
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ported by the farm bloc which demanded protection for farmers 7 additional
to that provided by exempting farm workers from wage and hour coverage. 8 However, a complete denial of wage and hour benefits to labor handling agricultural products would have allowed urban plants to avoid wage
and hour obligations. 9 To reconcile these conflicting interests a compromise was achieved by making the exemption operative only within an
"area of production" as defined by the administrator. It was expressly
conceded that an allowance for differences between rural and urban labor
conditions might be made in formulating the definition.'0 To deny benefits
to larger plants located in rural areas, the administrator eventually defined
area of production to include establishments handling crops produced
within the general vicinity and employing fewer than seven persons."
Sharp conflict arose in the lower federal courts as to the scope of the
administrator's powers and the validity of the "seven employees" provision.12 In Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products,InL1.' the Supreme Court
declared that provision invalid.
The three opinions in Holly Hill differed greatly in their interpretation of the administrative function. justice Roberts, concurring, agreed
with many district courts 14 and the Fifth Circuit. 15 He thought the administrator's powers were limited to fact-finding of existing areas of crop
production-such as the citrus or cotton belts. Four dissenting justices 16
interpreted § 13 (a) 10 as exempting plants which were economically agricultural, and viewed the administrative task as a wide legislative adjustment
of farm and labor interests in wages of particular industries. Justice
Frankfurter, in the controlling opinion, adopted an intermediate position:
the administrator was to ascertain what economic factors operate with
respect to agricultural-industrial labor near the farm so as to necessitate
7. Section 7(a) of the act protected cannery and warehouse operators in their
own right by providing exemption from overtime wage provisions during the handling
season. 52 STAT. 1063 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §207(c) (1952).
8. 52 STAT. 1067 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §213(a)6 (1952).
9. Even as limited by the administrative definition, the economic effect of
§ 13(a) 10 is substantial. It was estimated in 1944 that some 750,000 employees were
potentially within the exemption and from twenty-five to fifty million dollars in
wages was involved. Memorandum for Adm'r of the Wage and Hour Division, as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 3, Addison v. Holly
Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
10. 81 CONG. REc. 7877 (1937) ; 83 CoNG. REc. 7402, 7405 (1938).
11. 29 CoDm FED. REGS. § 5362(b) (Supp. 1939).
12. Cases are cited in Brief for Petitioners, pp. 31-32, Addison v. Holly Hill
Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944), and in Brief of Respondent, pp. 42-54,
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., mspra.
13. 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
14. See, e.g., Clark v. Jacksonville Compress Co., 45 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Tex.
1941) ; Fleming v. Farmers Peanut Co., 37 F. Supp. 628 (M.D. Ga. 1941). See also
note 12 supra.
15. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc. v. Addison, 136 F.2d 323, 326 (5th Cir.
1943) (Waller, J., concurring) ; Fleming v. Farmers Peanut Co., 128 F.2d 404 (5th
Cir. 1942).
16. 322 U.S. 607, 625, 642 (Rutledge, Black, Murphy and Douglas, J.J., dissenting).
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the application of § 13 (a) 10, to assess and synthesize those factors, and then
to define geographical areas within which such influences operated. The
"seven employees" provision was rejected as an attempt to expand administrative authority by according size of plants a significance wholly apart
from the definition of "area." Decision was expressly reserved as to the
validity of the population provision; recently, the Tenth Circuit sustained
it in Tobin v. Traders Compress Corp.Yt relying on Holly Hill. Thus,
with the Lovvorn decision, a conflict has arisen as to the meaning of Justice
Frankfurter's opinion.
Invalidation of the "seven employees" provision in Holly Hill is not
authority for Lovvorn's rejection of the population provision. Legislative
history indicates that the difference between rural and urban labor conditions, unlike plant size,' 8 is an economic consideration relevant to the determination of an area. Thus, the definition should be sustained unless
the population provision does not reasonably express this factor's territorial effect. The Lovvorn opinion does not consider this issue.
In practice, Lovvorn denies the administrative flexibility recognized in
Holly Hill. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Fifth Circuit accepts
Justice Frankfurter's interpretation of the administrative function. The
Lovvorn holding is that area may not be defined by the use of one criterion
to establish initial boundaries, followed by the use of other criteria to
exclude portions already within the rough area. This result denies practical effect to factors which the administrator is empowered to consider,
inasmuch as it is impossible to find any single test which will express
completely or adequately all economic factors related to urban and agricultural labor. The logical implication of the Lovvorn case is that the
Fifth Circuit still regards the administrative function as fact-finding. Because the opinion emphasizes Holly Hill's requirement of geographic
boundaries without giving equal emphasis to administrative discretion in
the consideration of economic factors, and since any additional exclusion,
regardless of its economic relevance, would be invalid under Lovvorn's
reasoning, the court seems to assimilate areas of production to the actual
farm districts and would confine the administrator to their description.
Persistence in this belief, despite Justice Frankfurter's emphasis upon an
economic determination and despite impracticability of defining specific
regions for over 300 crops, 9 might be explained by the economic result of
the present definition: 82% of all cotton compresses and warehouses are
17. 199 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1952), reversing 107 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Okla. 1951)
(held: administrative function fact-finding and exclusion arbitrary), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 909 (1952).
18. It is arguable that Justice Frankfurter required merely that all provisions
of the definition be territorial. This ignores his emphasis on the congressional belief
that plant size was economically irrelevant. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products,
Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 615 (1944); 81 CONG. IEc. 7877 (1937).
19. Memorandum for Adm'r of the Wage and Hour Division, as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 5, Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit
Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944).

RECENT CASES

excluded because they are located at railheads in larger towns.20 This led
2
the district court 2 1 and a dissenting Tenth Circuit judge in Tobin 2 to
claim that farmer protection had been eroded; no consideration was given
to the fact that an adjustment was also intended for labor's protection.
The continuing judicial battle over "area of production" which has followed
the passage of § 13(a) 10 indicates that the section has merely shifted the
conflict between agricultural and labor interests to the courts, and in the
Fifth Circuit has resulted in unwarranted judicial intrusion into the administrative process.P

BankruptcyJURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY COURT IN
THIRD PARTY CONTROVERSY UPHELD
A Kansas public warehouseman sold grain to an Illinois corporation,
and an initial delivery was made from the elevator which contained commingled grain of the warehouseman and of depositors. Before the remainder of the contractual amount was delivered, bankruptcy proceedings
were instituted against the warehouseman. In order to recover the value
of the undelivered grain, the corporation filed a reclamation petition to
establish a trust or a preferred claim in the proceeds from the sale of grain
within the elevator on the date of bankruptcy. The sale proceeds constituted a special fund, distinct from the bankrupt's assets, to be divided
pro rata among the bailors who had deposited grain. Since the value of
outstanding warehouse receipts held by bailors exceeded the fund, the
trustee counterclaimed for a return of the grain delivered previously to
the corporation, on the theory that bailors of a bankrupt warehouseman may
recover from any purchaser to the extent that the property delivered to him
depleted the quantity possessed by the warehouseman as bailee below the
amount of outstanding warehouse receipts.' The referee ordered the corporation, as a prerequisite for the allowance of its claim against the assets
20. Messenger v. Traders Compress Co., 107 F. Supp. 354, 359-60 (E.D. Okla.
1951).
21. Id. at 360.

22. 199 F.2d 8, 12 (10th Cir. 1952) (Pickett, J., dissenting).
23. Unlike Tobin, which was an administrative suit to enjoin violation of the
act, Lovvorn was an employees' suit for wages. Thus, the administrator was not a
party although the National Compress and Cotton Warehouse Association (which
submitted a brief in Tobin) appeared. This may have contributed to the result inasmuch as the Fifth Circuit, in a dictum after Tobin, had indicated its preference for
the dissenting opinion. Jenkins v. Durkin, 208 F.2d 941, 945 (5th Cir. 1954). Certiorari is precluded unless the employees petition for the writ. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)
(1952).
1. Hall v. Pillsbury, 43 Minn. 33, 44 N.W. 673 (1890). The UNiFoRm COm§§2-403(2), 7-205(1) and comment 1, expressly repudiates this
theory.
MERCILL CODE
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of the bankrupt as a general creditor, to "turn over" that amount of grain
or its value which would satisfy the theory of the trustee. The district
court sustained the referee's order, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to determine controversies
between third parties concerning the ownership of property in which
neither the trustee nor the bankrupt has title, if it is otherwise impossible
to administer completely the bankrupt estate. Central States Corp. v.
Luther, 215 F. 2d 38 (10th Cir. 1954) (2-1), cert. denied, 23 U.S.L. WEEK
3209 (U.S. March 1, 1955).
Bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction 2 in controversies over property
if the bankrupt has a property interest therein 3 or was in actual or constructive possession thereof at the time of bankruptcy; 4 but bankruptcy
courts have been held not to have jurisdiction in certain suits which have
been designated as "third party controversies." 3 These controversies seem
to have the following characteristics: the disputes have no effect on other
general creditors 0 or the assets of the bankrupt; 7 settlement by the bankruptcy court may delay closing the estate; 8 and the parties may litigate in
another forum without cost to the estate.9 The instant case relied on In re
Burton Coal Co.,10 which made an explicit exception to the rule that the
trustee must have possession of or an interest in the disputed property and
upheld jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in a controversy between a
creditor and a third party over the ownership of stock in the hands of the
creditor. However, in the Burton case the bankrupt company could not
reorganize until settlement of the controversy, which would determine the
creditor's voting rights in reorganization; therefore, the dispute was not of
the type usually considered a third party controversy, since it affected all
creditors and the estate, and would have delayed reorganization. In the
present case, unlike Burton, general creditors other than the disputants
are not affected since the amount they receive would not be altered by the
outcome of subsequent litigation between the corporation and the bailors;
for example, if the bailors should win in this dispute, their claim against
the bankrupt's assets would be decreased by the value of the grain in the
"turn over" order and the corporation's claim would be increased by the
same amount, while the total amount of claims by other general creditors
would remain the same. The estate of the bankrupt could be settled before
the outcome of the dispute if the trustee placed with the court an amount
2. Bankruptcy Act §§2, 23(a), 11 U.S.C. §§ 11, 46a (1952).
3. Chauncey v. Dyke Bros., 119 Fed. 1 (8th Cir. 1902) ; In re Larkey, 214 Fed.

867 (D.N.J. 1914).

4. Denton v. Gurnett & Co., 69 F.2d 750 (1st Cir. 1934); Nisbet v. Federal
Title & Trust Co., 229. Fed. 644 (8th Cir. 1915).
5. In re Chakos, 24 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1928) ; Brumby v. Jones, 141 Fed. 318
(5th Cir. 1905).
6. Nixon v. Michaels, 38 F.2d 420, 424 (8th Cir. 1930).
7. Goldenberg v. Westover, 150 F2d 388, 390 (9th Cir. 1945).
8. In re Railroad Supply Co., 78 F2d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 1935).
9. E.g., In re Bowen, 48 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1942).

10. 126 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1942).
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sufficient to satisfy the claim of a general creditor for the value of the grain
involved in the "turn over" order.11 The loser of the suit would then
receive the sum placed with the court.
The instant factual situation would seem to furnish a sound argument
for the bankruptcy court's assumption of jurisdiction. The most important
issues to be resolved in the controversy between the bailors and the corporation are the.amount of grain remaining in the elevator after the initial
delivery, and whether subsequent additions to the common mass ever increased the quantity in the elevator to an amount equal to the sum of
outstanding warehouse receipts. 12 Both the witnesses and the records of
the warehouseman's grain transactions are easily accessible to the bankruptcy court, which can settle the controversy quickly and in the locale
where all of the bailors reside; otherwise, the bailors must institute a class
suit' 3 against the corporation in Illinois, thus increasing the cost and inconvenience of their litigation. However, this argument must be analyzed
in light of the major purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, which are securing
possession of an insolvent's assets, and discharging worthy debtors from
unpaid debts without undue delay and expense. 14 In the absence of other
reasons for assuming jurisdiction, elimination of litigation between third
parties hardly could be even an implied purpose of the Act. If a sum were
deposited with the court as suggested above, all creditors would receive
their equitable share of the bankrupt's assets. Further advantages of this
solution are that the total cost of litigation is placed on the rival parties,
rather than increasing the costs to the estate borne by all creditors, and
numerous appeals do not injure financially other general creditors or delay
the final discharge of the bankrupt. However, this solution has at least
two qualifications which prevent it from being a panacea for all cases. If
the rival claimants are unable to agree on the value of the disputed property, then the total claims against the bankrupt's assets could not be determined and the trustee would be unable to place a fund with the court since
the ratio of the disputed claim to total claims could not be ascertained. A
second problem is presented when the subsequent litigation is delayed or
is never instituted, since final distribution of the bankrupt's assets would be
postponed until the controversy is decided or the statute of limitations has
expired. When these difficulties can be overcome, the solution suggested
above should be utilized, especially in light of the serious procedural problems which may be presented when the bankruptcy court takes jurisdiction
in a third party controversy. If a claimant presents a reclamation petition,
and the trustee counterclaims for property held by the claimant on the
theory that it is actually the property of the bankrupt, the counterclaim
also is handled in a summary procedure so long as the counterclaim arises
11. See Goldenberg v. Westover, 150 F.2d 388, 390 (9th Cir. 1945) ; In re Railroad Supply Co., 78 F2d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 1935).
12. Instant case at 47.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3). CI.ARI, CODE PLEADING 404-08 (2d ed. 1947).

14. 1 REm NGmrON,

BANKRUPTCY

33-35, 57-59 (5th ed. 1950).
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from the same transaction as the claim. 15 The adverse party does not have
a right to a jury trial,1' and the court may exercise general equity powers,
such as contempt procedures 17 and power over property outside the territorial jurisdiction of the district court. Summary procedure also would
be utilized if the court would not differentiate between a counterclaim involving property of the bankrupt and a counterclaim which, as in the present
situation,' 8 involved property of other creditors but was closely related to
the bankruptcy proceedings. A creditor may be discouraged from filing
a valid claim because he fears that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction
to determine that he must turn over to the trustee property which is the
subject of litigation with another creditor but is not and never was an
asset of the estate. Consequently, some claimants could be placed in a serious dilemma: if the claim is not filed, claimant forfeits his share of the
estate, thus permitting utilization of the broad powers of the bankruptcy
court to bring about an inequitable division of the bankrupt's assets; if
the claim is filed, claimant may forfeit his right to a jury trial and the protection of jurisdictional rules at law. Assuming that the trustee's counterclaim does not arise from the same transaction as the original claim and
the claimant objects to the summary procedure, the trustee may then bring
a plenary suit. However, for purposes of diversity of citizenship in a suit
against the corporation, the citizenship of the bankrupt, 19 not of the bailors,
will determine whether the plenary suit will be tried in a state or federal
court, and some litigants may be prejudiced thereby. In a plenary procedure, claimant is not faced with procedural hardships, but the bankrupt's estate, and consequently all general creditors, bear part of the litigation costs while receiving no benefit. In order to protect claimants and all
general creditors, bankruptcy courts should not assume jurisdiction, nor
authorize the trustee to institute a plenary suit, in controversies between
third parties unless it is otherwise clearly impossible to administer completely the bankrupt estate.
Chattel MortgagesASSIGNEE OF INSTALLMENT SALES CONTRACT HAS
PRIORITY OVER FLOOR PLAN MORTGAGEE
An automobile dealer's chattel mortgage to A finance company provided that the dealer was to display the auto, sell for cash or upon terms
approved in writing by A company, and hold the funds from the sale in
trust until payment of the lien. After the mortgage was filed, the dealer
15. James Talcott, Inc. v. Glavin, 104 F.2d 851 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
598 (1939); 2 CoLLRE,
16. Id. at 233.

BAxxRuPTcY

513-14 (14th ed. 1942).

17. Id. at 535.

18. Procedure initially was summary under § 2a (2) (allowance of claim), and the
corporation's failure to object to such procedure in dealing with the counterclaim
operated as consent. Bankruptcy Act §2a(7), 11 U.S.C. §lla(7) (1952).
The
corporation did not contend that the differences in the counterclaims should make a
difference in treatment or that
§ 2a(7) should not apply in a third party controversy.
2

19. Bankruptcy Act § 3(a), 11 U.S.C. §46a (1952).
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sold the car on a conditional sale contract, assigned the contract to B finance
company for cash, and failed to pay A company. In a suit by A company
against B company for sums received on the contract, the court held for
B company on the ground that the installment sale and subsequent assignment amounted to a sale for cash as permitted in the chattel mortgage.
Fidelity Corp. of Mich. v. Associates Discount Corp., 66 N.W.2d 235
(Mich. 1954).
The general rule is that recording constitutes constructive notice and
precludes subsequent purchasers from taking priority.' An exception to
this is the floor plan situation whereby a financer permits a chattel in which
he has a security interest to be kept with a dealer for the purpose of retail
sale. Even though he has recorded, the financer will be estopped to assert
his interest against a bona fide retail purchaser.2 However, a financer can
assert his security against a dealer purchasing at wholesale 3 and an insurer
of the dealer who takes rights by subrogation. 4 In National Bond & Investment Co. v. Union Investment Co.,5 the scope of which is the center
of the dispute in the instant case, A finance company, secured by a recorded
chattel mortgage, financed an auto to a dealer on a floor plan which provided that the dealer should pay off the lien at or before a sale. The
dealer sold the auto under a conditional sale contract which was assigned
subsequently to B finance company. In a controversy over possession of
the auto, the court held that A company had priority over B company,
reasoning that the latter acquired only the rights of its assignor, the dealer,
whose rights were subject to the mortgage lien. The court in Fidelity distinguished National Bond on the ground that the mortgage agreement
involved in that case did not authorize a sale for cash before satisfaction of
the lien, and, as an added factor, that the case did involve an action for
possession of the mortgaged vehicle rather than for the payments made to
the retail financer.6
In protecting the retail financer because a sale for cash is permitted,
the decision does not leave the inventory financer in any worse position than
if the dealer had received payment directly from the retail purchaser. In
1. Pinconning State Bank v. Henry, 258 Mich. 44, 241 N.W. 913 (1932);
Saginaw Financing Corp. v. Detroit Lubricator Co., 256 Mich. 441, 240 N.W. 44

(1932).
2. Daas v. Contract Purchase Corp., 318 Mich. 348, 28 N.W.2d 226 (1947).
3. Associates Discount Corp. v. Main Street Motors, Inc., 113 N.E.2d 734
(Ohio 1952); Colonial Finance Co. v. McCrate, 60 Ohio App. 68, 19 N.E.2d 527
(1938).
4. See Stamler v. Universal Ins. Co., 305 Mich. 131,' 136, 9 N.W.2d 33, 34
(1943).
5. 260 Mich. 307, 244 N.W. 483 (1932).
6. The court quoted with apparent approval a portion of the trial court's opinion

[Record, pp. 39-40] which attempted to distinguish National Bond: "Here the plaintiff is not seeking to enforce its mortgage lien upon the mortgaged vehicle. Instead,
it seeks to impress a trust upon the contract . . . assigned to the defendant." 66
N.W.2d 235, 236 (Mich. 1954).
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both instances, the inventory financer has recourse only against the dealer
for the cash paid. 7 However, since the retail financer is protected only
when a sale for cash is authorized, to be safe he still must check in every
case to determine whether there is a lien and, if so, whether the sale was
authorized. If he does find these facts, it seems that he is protected even
though he was in a position to insure payment to the inventory financer
merely by incorporating the latter's name on the check sent to the dealer.
Inventory financers theoretically could protect themselves from the Fidelity
rule by drafting a mortgage which prohibits sales without permission.
Aside from being impractical, there may be further difficulty with this
provision. If the dealer assigns in breach of the mortgage, the inventory
financer has the prior right to the auto under the National Bond rule;
however, even though that case used language broad enough to give priority
to the inventory financer over all rights derived from the dealer, a court
might use the distinction between payment and possession mentioned
by the court in Fidelity and deny the right-to payments on the assigned8
contract, especially since there is no Michigan precedent on this problem.
If this distinction is followed, the Michigan law will be in a strange state of
compromise. The retail financer will have the right to payments on the
retail contract, but may lose his security interest in the chattel to the inventory financer if the purchaser defaults. The inventory financer will
have the right to possession of the chattel on default, but no right to payments from the purchaser upon whose default this right depends. Though
the National Bond and Fidelity cases are reconcilable and the court stated
it was distinguishing the two situations, the facts of both cases are so
similar that it is uncertain whether another Michigan court faced squarely
with the National Bond situation will decide the same way.
In making the decision on which of two financers shall have priority
in a floor plan-assignment situation, it seems that the choice should not
be made on either the form of remedy sought or the particular wording of
the dealer's power to sell, but upon considerations of more basic policy.
Many of the reasons for application of the estoppel protection to retail purchasers do not extend to finance companies. The retail financer is familiar
with the dealer's business methods and with the floor planning practice.
Under chattel mortgage acts requiring recordation of each security transaction,9 it can easily use its organization to search out encumbrances on
7. Other decisions also have equated retail financers with retail purchasers and
afforded them the same protection. Commercial Credit Co. v. Barney Motor Co.,
10 Cal.2d 718, 76 P.2d 1181 (1938); De Cozen Motor Co. v. Kaufman, 113 N.J.L.
343, 174 Atl. 893 (Sup. Ct. 1934); First Nat. Bank of Binghamton v. Arthur
Hermann Co., 275 App. Div. 415, 90 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1949). Cf. State
Say. Bank of Sharpsburg v. Universal Credit Co., 233 Iowa 247, 8 N.W.2d 719
(1943).
8. Shand v. Spencer, 299 Mich. 429, 300 N.W. 151 (1941), implies that the
inventory financer may demand payment directly to it from the retail purchaser
but is distinguishable because the retail contract was in the hands of the dealer and
no rights of an assignee for value were involved.
9. See, e.g., MIcn. STAT. ANN. § 26.929 (1953); N.Y. LiEN LAW § 232.
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the specific chattel. By contrast, to protect himself the inventory financer
can do little short of placing an overseer with the dealer. Despite the
retail financer's special knowledge and the vulnerability of the inventory
financer, the Uniform Commercial Code 10 and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act 1 give priority to the retail financer. These uniform acts do
not require recordation of each security agreement but only notice of the
type of chattel which is being financed. 1 2 Under these provisions the retail
financer has no quick and dependable method of ascertaining whether there
is a lien on the particular chattel because he has no record notice and cannot
rely on either the dealer who is seeking the financing or the inventory
financer, who is a competitor for the chattel paper. Therefore, the most
practical solution to the controversy between the inventory and the retail
financer may very well depend on the nature of the recording requirement
for the particular type of security interest involved. The Code suggests
that the retail financer should have priority in order to prevent the inventory financer from gaining a monopoly on the resulting chattel paper. 18
The implication appears to be that other companies will be unable to compete with this financer for the retail paper on which he has a lien and,
therefore, interest rates may be raised to the detriment of the installment
buyer. This argument is weakened, however, by the fact that rates will not
necessarily climb, since financers still will compete for the "monopoly
package" by giving favorable rates in both the inventory and retail transactions. Moreover, competition for the retail paper may be reflected not
in reduced rates to the buyer but in greater profits to the dealer. 14 On the
other hand, it may be argued that prosperity to the dealer may benefit the
consumer indirectly because the dealer's attempt to compete for retail sales
may result in more favorable installment terms and larger trade-in allowances.', It seems unwise to base any decision on this monopoly factor
until a thorough study has been made of its economic effects on the installment buyer.
CODE § 9-306(4).
10. UNmROR Com0ic mc
11. UNxIFORm TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 9(1) (a). Citizens Nat. Trust & Say.
Bank v. Beverly Finance Co., 273 P.2d 714 (Cal. 1954) ; Canandaigua Nat. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Commercial Credit Corp., 204 Misc. 946, 126 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sup. Ct.
1953), rev'd on other grounds, 135 N.Y.S.2d 66 (App. Div., 4th Dep't 1954).
This section differs from § 9-306(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code which
apparently provides that the retail financer has priority even though he has knowledge
of the inventory loan. See BIRNBAUM, SECURE) TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
Coi mcALL CODE 202 (1954).
12. See UNinom COMmERcIAL CODE § 9-402(3) and comment 2; UNImFoRM TRUST
REcEns

Act § 13(2).

13. See UNnoRm CoDmuciAL CODE § 9-306, comment 2(c).
14. See Cavers, The Consumer's Stake in the Finance Company Code Controversy, 2 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 200, 204, 211-12 (1935).
15. See id. at 204.
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InsuranceTRANSACTION HELD A CONDITIONAL SALE UNDER
EXCLUSION CLAUSE ALTHOUGH VENDEE
HAD NO RIGHT OF USE
Plaintiff, unable to continue payments on the chattel mortgage to
which his car was subject, sold it to one Bessette for $140 and assumption
by Bessette of the balance due on the mortgage. The sale was conditional on the acceptance of Bessette as mortgagor by the chattel mortgagee,
and until such time both parties agreed not to drive the car. It was placed
on the premises of Bessette and he was given one set of keys; the plaintiff
retained the license plates, certificate of title, and the other set of keys.
After payment of the price but before acceptance by the chattel mortgagee,
Bessette drove the car on the highway and it was destroyed by fire.
Plaintiff's insurance company refused to pay the loss on the ground that
the agreement was a conditional sale and hence within the terms of an exclusion clause in the policy. The Supreme Court of Kansas denied recovery, holding that, even though Bessette did not have the right to use
the car, the agreement was a conditional sale because dependent upon
the finance company's acceptance of Bessette as mortgagor. Browr v.
Tri-State Ins. Co., 274 P.2d 769 (Kan. 1954).
Automobile insurance policies universally contain clauses excluding
coverage for fire when the automobile is the subject of a bailment lease,
conditional sale, mortgage or other encumbrance.' A conditional sale
ordinarily is defined as a contract for the sale of goods under which possession and right of use are in the buyer but property does not vest in
him until the performance of some condition. 2 Usually this condition is
the payment of price,3 but a transaction is not outside the normal definition
of conditional sale merely because a condition other than payment is involved. 4 However, there are considerable dicta in support of the proposition that a transaction can be classified as a conditional sale only if the
vendee has the right of use; 5 and, considering in addition that the commer1. See 2

Form in

RICHARDS, INSURANCE

§ 286 (5th ed., Freeman, 1952) ; see also Standard
790 (2d

PATTERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE

ed. 1947).
2. First Acceptance Corp. v. Kennedy, 95 F. Supp. 861, 871 (N.D. Iowa 1951);
UNIFoRM CONDITIONAL SALES

ACt § 1;

VOLD, SALES § 95

(1931)

;

2 WILLISTON,

SALES

§330 (Rev. ed. 1948).
3. 1 W.LISTON, SALES § 7 (Rev. ed. 1948). The definition of conditional sales
in the Kansas statute does not include the transaction here involved, since it is
limited to sales conditional upon the payment of price. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 58-315a
(1949). However, the court did not consider this act since it was passed for the
purpose of protecting innocent purchasers and creditors of conditional vendees by
requiring the recordation of conditional sales contracts.
4. Fisch v. Steingold, 79 F,2d 448 (4th Cir. 1935) ; Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Casey,
61 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1932); Vermont Marble Co. v. Brow, 109 Cal. 236, 41 Pac.
1031 (1895).
5. E.g., In re Imperial Brewing Co., 127 F.2d 766, 769 (4th Cir. 1942); First
Acceptance Corp. v. Kennedy, 95 F. Supp. 861, 871 (N.D. Iowa 1951); Bowden v.
Bank of America, 36 Cal.2d 406, 413, 224 P.2d 713, 717 (1950) ; Luke v. Mercantile
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cial purpose of a conditional sale is to allow the vendee to use the chattel
while he is under an obligation to the vendor, a court would be justified
in holding as a matter of definition that the vendee's right of use is a necessary. part of a conditional sale. Evidently the instant court was unwilling
to base a decision on this general proposition. To reach the same result,
the court could have restricted the term "conditional sale" to its usual meaning by recourse to the common rule that a disputed clause is construed
against the insurer, who drafted it."
The court, however, might have thought that the use of the car by
Bessette was within the risk which the insurance company sought to avoid
by the words "conditional sale": that the actual party in interest, the conditional vendee, as compared with the titular owner, might fall into a different rate class 7 or have an unsatisfactory accident record. The transaction
between the plaintiff and Bessette had been completed; when Bessette
drove the car, without permission, he was more like an actual owner than
a bailee. However, plaintiff had no intent to terminate his insurance prior
to final settlement, and the issue becomes who should bear the loss for
Bessette's unauthorized conduct. The general problem of risk not contemplated by the insurance company was presented in two cases 8 in which
used car dealers permitted customers purchasing cars to use them before
financing details were completed but after conditional sales contracts had
been signed. The cars were damaged and, despite the sales contracts,
the insurance companies were held liable. The reasoning was that since
the sales had not been completed the dealer retained his ownership interest.
Doctrinally the used car cases, which involved the problem of whether
the conditional sales contract had been fully executed, are distinguishable
from the instant case, which was concerned with whether the dealings between the parties could properly be called a conditional sale. But all three
decisions involve purchasers driving automobiles as actual owners-a risk
not intended to be assumed by the insurance company. In the used car
cases the dealer might have lost the sale had he not placed the car at the
disposal of the customer despite the incomplete financial arrangements.
The courts, to protect the dealer, seemed to believe the policy should cover
any reasonable risk the dealer might meet in furtherance of his business.
Applying this rationale to the instant case, the arrangement selected appears
to have been a reasonable means of achieving the legitimate purpose of
both parties: that each would be assured that the other would not drive the
car. The likelihood of Bessette driving it, while he had possession, was
Acceptance Corp., 111 Cal. App.2d 431, 435, 244 P.2d 764, 768 (1952); Hansen v.
Kuhn, 226 Iowa 794, 799, 285 N.W. 249, 252 (1939) and cases cited therein; Leban
v. North Main Street Garage, Inc., 312 Mass. 547, 550, 45 N.E.2d 945, 947 (1942);
Universal Finance Corp. v. Hamner, 61 S.D. 540, 544, 250 N.W. 33, 35 (1933).
6. See 13 APPLEIAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACriCE § 7481 (1943) ; 3 CoRBiN,
CONTRActs § 559 (1951) ; 1954 Wis.'L. REv. 335.
7. AUTOMOBILE CASUALTY MANUAL Rule 16 (Nat. Bur. of Cas. Underwriters,
Rev. ed. Feb. 16, 1955).
8. Bisi v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 137 Conn. 424, 78 A.2d 533 (1951);
Rash v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 246 S.W.2d 990 (Ky. 1951).
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minimized by removal of the license plates and retention of the certificate
of title.9 Although it is true that a different arrangement might have been
made, such as placing the car in escrow, 10 this does not seem to be sufficient
reason for proscribing a reasonable business transaction. The rationale of
the used car cases, which would place the risk of loss of a reasonable
transaction on the insurance company, seems more adapted to commercial
needs than the result of the instant case.

Labor LawLACK OF AUTHORITY OF EMPLOYER'S BARGAINING
REPRESENTATIVE DOES NOT VIOLATE
§ 8(a)5 OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
A company which maintains its principal offices in Illinois appointed
a San Francisco attorney as its representative in a collective bargaining proceeding at its subsidiary plant in San Leandro California. The attorney
was authorized to receive and discuss the union's proposals and transmit
them to the head office in Illinois, but not to negotiate an agreement. At the
first bargaining meeting the union presented a proposed contract which was
forwarded to the Illinois office. The company unilaterally changed some
of the working conditions at the plant prior to the second meeting, at which
the union rejected the company's counterproposal and demanded a company bargaining representative with authority to negotiate. The employees
went out on strike three days later. Three similarly unsuccessful meetings
followed and approximately four months after the first meeting the union
filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board charging that
the company had violated § 8(a) (5) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which provides that an employer must "bargain collectively" in "good faith" with his
employees.' After a hearing before a trial examiner, the NLRB held that
on the facts presented such a limitation of bargaining authority violated
§ 8(a) (5), and ordered the company to vest its representative with sufficient authority to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement. On review,2
the circuit court held that lack of this authority does not constitute per se a
violation of § 8(a) (5).8 Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. NLRB, 216 F.2d
273 (9th Cir. 1954).
9. It is illegal to drive a car without license plates. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 8-142
(1949).
10. Cf. Mackintosh v. Agricultural Fire Ins. Co., 150 Cal. 440, 89 Pac. 102
(1907) ; Vierneisel v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 77 Cal. App2d 229, 175 P.2d 63 (1946);
Pomeroy v. Aetna Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 214, 120 Pac. 344 (1912).
1. 61 STAT. 141, 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (5), (d) (1952).
2. The company petitioned the circuit court for review pursuant to 61 STAT. 148
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1952), while the NLRB petitioned for enforcement of
its order pursuant to 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1952).
3. The NLRB had found also that the company's unilateral action of changing
some of the working conditions during negotiations violated § 8(a) (5). The court
affirmed this finding and ordered the Board's order enforced regarding this matter.
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One of the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act and the TaftHartley Act was to eliminate inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees 4 by proscribing certain unfair labor practices and
providing for collective bargaining. 5 The present Act, to ensure genuine
collective bargaining, imposes a duty to bargain in "good faith," 0 and,
since this standard is not susceptible of precise definition, the NLRB has
had to exercise a large degree of discretion. Because of the impossibility
of ascertaining subjective "good faith," the Board normally has refrained
from considering any single factor as conclusive evidence of a refusal to
bargain in "good faith." 7 Rather, it usually has ascribed an intent not
to bargain to a number of objective factors.which, when taken together,
constitute a pattern of conduct.8 Some single acts, such as a refusal to
supply the union with current wage data 9 or a refusal to sign a contract
embodying the terms of a collective agreement,' 0 are so antithetical to the
bargaining process that the Board and courts have considered them per
se violations of § 8(a) (5). Though occasionally NLRB trial examiners
have found that lack of authority of the bargaining representative in itself
violates § 8(a) (5)," x the NLRB and courts have never had to evaluate
the effect of this factor alone upon the bargaining process, since in all
previous cases it was possible to utilize a pattern of conduct test.' 2 But
in the instant case the only indicia of a refusal to bargain in "good faith"
were the attorney's lack of authority and the unilateral change of working
conditions.' 3 Unable to apply the usual pattern of conduct test because
4. See generally Frey, Democracy, Free Enterprise, and Collective Bargaining,
12 LAw & CoNrEmp. PRoB. 264 (1947).
5. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §158 (1940), as amended, 61 STAT. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §158 (1952).
6. 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1952), provides: "For the
purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
"
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ...
7. See, e.g., Standard Generator Service Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 790 (1950), enforcement granted, 186 F2d 606 (8th Cir. 1951).
8. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850, 857 (1951).
9. NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 881 (1950), enforcement
granted, 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951).
10. H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 22 N.L.R.B. 250, enforcement granted, 110 F.2d
843 (6th Cir. 1940), aff'd, 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
11. E.g., Standard Generator Service Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 790, 800 (1950), enforceinent granted, 186 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1951); Brown and Root, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B.
520, 531 (1949); Republican Publishing Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 1085, 1103-04 (1947).
12. See cases cited in note 11 supra; Great Southern Trucking Co. v. NLRB,
127 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 652 (1942); Century Cement Mfg.
Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1952); Burgie Vinegar Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 829 (1946);
V-0 Milling Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 348 (1942); Agwilines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1 (1936).
13. Instant case at 275.
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of insufficent evidence, and presented with a flagrant breakdown of collective
bargaining, the Board had to hold, in order to intervene, that lack of
authority per se violated § 8(a) (5). However, its opinion failed to explain
why it reached this conclusion and whether this constituted a general
change of policy.
Collective bargaining usually involves many disputed issues and,
as a result, a good deal of "horse trading" will go on until a final agreement
is reached. This type of multi-issue bargaining requires a representative
with authority sufficient to make concessions at the bargaining table, because
the possible number of combinations of making concessions on one or more
issues while winning concessions on others is so great that any system
other than personal confrontation of the real parties in interest will break
up the continuity of the bargaining process and, therefore, be impractical.
Moreover, personal confrontation which of necessity will call for face-toface justifications of each party's position will tend to eliminate spurious
claims and facilitate the ability of each party to size up the other's real
position. Once this is done and the atmosphere cleared of exaggerated
demands, the process of give-and-take necessary to consummate an agreement can operate. Finally, where one party lacks authority, the other is
likely to become frustrated and disgusted because of the resulting delay
and inability to sit down with the real party in interest and hammer out
an agreement. Such ill feelings are likely to jeopardize the successful
conclusion of the bargaining process. However, though collective bargaining inherently demands bargaining representatives with authority to negotiate,14 it is difficult to prescribe the requisite quantum. Since in some
cases only one issue may be in contention or the parties may know each
other's real position, lack of authority may not disrupt the bargaining
process to such an extent that it should be considered a per se violation
of § 8(a) (5). For this reason, the Board may prefer to consider each case
as it comes up rather than try to define in a general policy statement the
degree of authority required, and this may explain why the Board limited
its holding to the facts of the instant case. 15 Although the Board's order
seems reasonable, the court's handling of the instant case leaves the NLRB
impotent to intervene in the five-month-old stalemate despite the fact that
the Board in its expertise had determined that a bargaining representative
with authority to negotiate would facilitate the collective bargaining. The
court may have been justified in reversing on the basis of the meager record before it; however, a more constructive approach would have been to
remand the case to the NLRB for a specific exposition of the Board's
16
reasons for its decision.
14. See

RANDLE,

COLLECTVE BARGAINING:

PRINCIPLES AND

PRACMCcS

148-49

(1951).
15. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 200 (1954).
16. Cf. Rosenblum v. FTC, 214 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1954) (dissenting opinion).

1955]

RECENT CASES

Rate RegulationGAS PIPE LINE UNABLE TO ABROGATE CONTRACT
BY FILING HIGHER RATE UNDER § 4(d)
OF NATURAL GAS ACT
United, an interstate natural gas pipe line, entered a ten year contract
to sell gas at a specified rate to Mobile, a local distributor. After seven
years, United filed an increased rate with the Federal Power Commission
pursuant to § 4(d) of the Natural Gas Act.' Mobile petitioned the Commission to reject the filing or, in the alternative, to grant a hearing on the
lawfulness of the filing. After the Commission denied all relief, the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Commission erred in allowing
United to abrogate its contract by filing a higher rate under § 4(d) without
a prior determination that the contract was unreasonable. One judge dissented on the ground that the decision required the Commission to exceed
its statutory authority. Mobile Gas Service Corp. v. FederalPower Commission, 215 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. granted, 23 U.S.L. WEEK

3181 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1955).
Section 4(d) of the Natural Gas Act provides that changes in filed
rate schedules or in contracts specifying rates shall be made by filing new
rates with the Federal Power Commission. 2 The Commission may set
aside rates found unreasonable. Section 5(a) authorizes hearings on
existing rates; 3 § 4(e) provides for hearings on newly filed rates, and
further provides that, except for industrial rates, newly filed rates may be
suspended pending a hearing for a total of six months from the time of
filing, but after that time the newly filed rates must become effective on
motion of the pipe line whether or not the hearing has been completed.4
Prior to Mobile it had never been decided whether a pipe line could terminate a contractual obligation to deliver gas at a specified rate, even though
that rate has not been shown to be unreasonable, merely by utilizing the
procedures authorized in § 4(d) for promulgation of new rates. The
problem posed is one of statutory construction since the Constitution does
1. 52 STAT. 821-33 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1952), as
amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717 (Supp. 1954) (hereinafter cited to section of N.G.A.
and applicable section of U.S.C.). N.G.A. §4(d), 15 U.S.C. 717c(d) (1952), provides: "Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made by any
natural-gas company in any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any
rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after thirty days' notice to the
Commission and to the public. Such notice shall be given by filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new schedules stating plainly the
change or changes to be made..
2. Ibid.
3. N.G.A. §5(a), 15 U.S.C. §717d(a) (1952), provides: 'Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint of any State,
municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate,
charge, or classification . . . or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract
affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable
rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order ..
4. N.G.A. §4(e), 15 U.S.C. §717c(e) (1952).
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not preclude the abrogation of contracts if required by the public interest.5
Since § 4(d) mentions contracts but imposes no restriction on the right
to file a change during the life of a contract, it may be inferred that Congress intended no restriction. From the suspension provisions in § 4(e)
the inference may be drawn that Congress intended all newly filed rates to
become effective within six months, regardless of the existence of a contract, unless the new rate is found unreasonable. However, there is no
indication in the legislative history of the Act that Congress ever considered
the problem raised by Mobile.0 The more natural inference would seem to
be that Congress did not intend to alter the mutually binding nature of
reasonable contracts, but merely intended to insure their continued reasonableness. 7 Under utility regulatory statutes which contain similar provisions for filing and approving rates, such as the Interstate Commerce
Act, some cases have intimated that any private contract with respect to
rates violates public policy, thus reflecting the legislative desire that all
similar utility customers in the particular industry pay the same rate.8
These cases are inapplicable to Mobile, however, for purchasers from gas
pipe lines vary so widely that individualized contracts are necessary,9 and,
in passing the Natural Gas Act, there was no apparent Congressional
intent ' 0 to alter the industry custom 1 of negotiating such contracts.
Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission 12 involved an
attempted rate increase by a power company, corresponding to United,
which had a contract with a local distributor, analogous to Mobile. The
5. Midland Realty Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 300 U.S. 109 (1937);
Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corp., 248 U.S. 372 (1919); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911); Armour Packing Co. v. United
States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908) ; see Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas R.R. Comm'n,
261 U.S. 379, 382, 383 (1923).
6. 83 CONG. REc. 8343-47, 9101 (1938) ; 81 CONG. REc. 2487-91, 6720-33, 9312-17
(1937) ; SEN. REP. No. 1162, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) ; H.R. REP. No. 2651, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ; Hearings before House Committee o Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H.R. 4008, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) ; Hearings before Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 11662, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
7. Statutes should not be construed to change common law rights by negative
inference. FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954); see Texas
& Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907); 3 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 6201, 6206 (3d ed. 1943).
8. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908); cf. Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public
Service Corp., 142 Ga. 841, 83 S.E. 946 (1914). The first two cases involved the
Interstate Commerce Act, and the third, a state statute.
9. As to the importance of such contracts in the industry, see generally FTC,
Final Report on Economic, Corporate, Operating and Financial Phases of the'
Natural-Gas-Producing,Pipe-Line, and Utility Industries, SEN. Doc. No. 92, pt. 84-A,
70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1936); SAIGH, THE NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION INDUSTRY
(unpublished thesis in the University of Pennsylvania Library, 1950); THOMAS,
SUPPLY CONTRACTS BETWEEN NATIONAL GAS PIPE LINE AND DISTRIBUTING COMPANIES (unpublished thesis in the University of Pennsylvania Library, 1930).

10. See legislative history, supra note 6.
11. It is the "common and usual" practice to have such contracts.
Respondents, pp. 10-11. See generally texts cited in note 9 supra.
12. D.C. Cir., Feb. 24, 1955.
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power company was subject to the Federal Power Act, which has provisions substantially identical in language to §§ 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas
Act.'- The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the provision analogous to § 4(d) of the Gas Act may not be used to
promulgate a reasonable rate higher than the rate specified in a filed contract unless the contract is found unreasonable under the section corresponding to § 5 (a) of the Gas Act. 14
In Tyler Gas Service Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.,' 5 another case
arising out of a recent filing by United of rates higher than filed contracts,
the local distributor sued in a federal district court for an injunction against
the rate increase and a declaration that its contract was enforceable. The
district court dismissed the bill, holding that the Commission, not the court,
was the proper forum for relief; the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The district
and circuit courts both interpreted § 4(d) of the Natural Gas Act as permitting abrogation of contracts by means of the filing procedure, on the
ground that an opposite decision would impede the adjustment of unreasonably high or low rates. The Mobile and Tyler opinions purport to be
consistent with each other,' 6 but their interpretations of § 4(d) are opposed.
It is clear that under the Tyler interpretation the distributor cannot preserve
its existing contract merely by proving that the rate provided therein is
reasonable.
Optimum service requires reasonable rates at all stages of the distribution process, and the Tyler court feared that Mobile's protection of
contracts would unduly impede the adjustment of unreasonably low contracts to the detriment of the public. In order to evaluate this fear it is
necessary only to consider what procedures are or may be available for
the raising of unreasonably low contracts, since we may assume that profit13. 49 STAT. 838-63 (1935), as amended, 16 U.S.C. H 791a-825u (1952). F.P.A.
§205, 16 U.S.C. §824(d) (1952), corresponds to §4 of the Natural Gas Act, except
that there is no proviso forbidding the suspension of industrial rates as there is in
§4(e) of the Gas Act. F.P.A. §206, 16 U.S.C. §824(e) (1952), corresponds to
§ 5 of the Natural Gas Act. But see note 20 infra.
14. Accord, Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Kan., 260
U.S. 48 (1922); cf. Allen W. Hinkel Dry Goods Co. v. Wichison Industrial Gas
Co., 64 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1933); Kaul v. American Independent Tel. Co., 95
Kan. 1, 147 Pac. 1130 (1915); see Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas R.R.
Comm'n, 261 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1923).
The holding in the Wichita case was approved by way of dictum in a case
arising under § 5 (a) of the Natural Gas Act. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC,
142 F.2d 943, 954 (1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 581, rehearing denied, 325 U.S. 891 (1945).
15. 217 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1954).
16. The Tyler court said its narrow holding, that relief must be sought from
the Commission, is not inconsistent with Mobile. However, this holding was not
based on the distributor's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies, but solely
on the court's interpretation of §4(d). Under the Mobile interpretation of §4(d),
the rate increase in Tyler was not pursuant to statutory authority, and the equitable
relief sought would have been appropriate. Mobile distinguished the district court
opinion in Tyler, Civil No. 1662, D.C. Tex., Dec. 2, 1953, the rationale of which
was adopted by the Fifth Circuit, on the ground that the gas was sold for different
ultimate purposes and the rates were treated differently under suspension provisions
of § 4(e). It is suggested that this distinction is not material to the issue of whether
the § 4(d) filing procedure allows a change to become effective when there is a filed
contract not determined to be unreasonable.
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motivated pipe lines will use any procedures available to them. Section 16
of the Natural Gas Act contains a general grant to the Commission of rulemaking and administrative power.17 There is no helpful authority on
whether § 16 gives the Commission enough power to order a hearing which
is not authorized by §§ 4(e) or 5(a). If it does, the Commission could
adopt a rule providing for a hearing to be initiated by pipe lines on the
reasonableness of contracts. But mere desirability of procedures is insufficient to justify their adoption absent statutory authority,'8 especially when
the result may be achieved by a method which is specifically authorized,
though less efficient. 19 A court may find that the suggested rule exceeds the
scope of § 16 on the ground that § 5 (a) provides a procedure for setting
aside unreasonable contracts. That section authorizes hearings to be initiated by the Commission "upon its own motion," or by specified complainants; pipe lines are not specified as complainants.2
But if a rate
provided in a contract becomes unreasonably low a pipe line may call that
fact to the Commission's attention, and the Commission probably will initiate a § 5 (a) hearing. Whether a pipe line can force the Commission
to grant a hearing is debatable. Although there is no useful authority,
"Cupon its own motion" should not be construed to give the Commission
unlimited discretion, but if the Commission refuses to grant a hearing after
a prima facie showing by a pipe line that a contract is unreasonable, a court
should reverse and order a hearing. Whether or not pipe lines are strictly
entitled to § 5(a) hearings, it is improbable that such hearings will be
withheld if a pipe line alleges that a contract is unreasonable. If § 5 (h)
is interpreted to deny a pipe line the right to a hearing on the reasonableness of a contract, courts should allow the Commission to use the § 16 rulemaking power to provide for such a hearing. In any event, it seems unlikely that Mobile will unduly impede the adjustment of unreasonably low
contracts.
The Mobile view is preferable to that of Tyler. The Tyler interpretation of § 4(d) imposes a hardship on those who have contracted to purchase gas, for it allows pipe lines to charge the highest reasonable rate
regardless of the reasonableness of the rates in their contracts or the purchaser's reliance thereon. It is clear that purchasers will be forced to pay
17. N.G.A. § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1952), provides: "The Commission shall
have power to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue, make, amend, and
rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate
to carry out the provisions of this chapter. ... "
18. See Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 202 F.2d 899, 901-03 (3d Cir.),
petition for writ of cert. dismissed, 345 U.S. 988 (1953).
19. Wallach v. SEC, 202 F.2d 462 (1953), 102 U. oF PA. L. Rxv. 395 (1954).
20. See note 3 supra. In the Sierra case, text at note 12 mspra, the court said
that, before a higher rate can be promulgated under the filing provision, the contract
must be found unreasonable under the section analogous to § 5(a) of the Natural
Gas Act. However, the section in the Federal Power Act provides for hearings "on
complaint" and does not specify complainants; the Sierra court did not have to
consider the possibility that a power company may be excluded from use of that
section.
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the newly filed rate for any gas they buy after the rate becomes effective; 21
it is possible that they also will be bound to continue to buy gas for the
remainder of the term in their contracts.2
There is always the threat
under Tyler that a shortsighted pipe line may abuse the power to abrogate
its reasonable contracts. If this threat tends to render long term contracts
a less effective device to secure future expectations, some buyers might be
deterred from entering such contracts. This result would deprive pipe
lines of many advantages. Pipe lines offering long term contracts at fixed
rates are able to attract business by inducing the conversion from more
expensive fuels. It is necessary for profitable operation that pipe lines
function at close to full capacity,23 and long term buyers' commitments,
typically secured in advance of construction of pipe lines, 24 insure future
markets and allow pipe lines to determine accurately the most economic
pipe size.2 5 Furthermore, insured markets add stability to pipe line finances
and make their securities attractive to investors on whom pipe lines rely
heavily for capital.20 The public also has an interest to protect, and the
Mobile decision benefits the economy generally by adding stability to the
gas distribution industry.
21. Northern Pac. Ry. v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 4 F2d 359 (9th
Cir.), appeal disnissed, 269 U.S. 535 (1925); Market St. Ry. v. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 6 F.2d 633 (N.D. Cal. 1925), appeal di.nissed, 271 U.S. 691 (1926);
City Water Co. of Sedalia v. Sedalia, 288 Mo. 411, 231 S.W. 942 (1921); Suburban
Water Co. v. Oakmont, 268 Pa. 243, 110 Atl. 778 (1920); see Allen W. Hinkel
Dry Goods Co. v. Wichison Industrial Gas Co., 64 F2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1933).
22. The rationale expressed in the cases in note 21 supra is that a party who

enters a contract with a regulated utility contemplates that the rates specified in the
contract are subject to change, and, if the rates are changed lawfully, the contracts

continue to be binding at the new legal rate. See Market St. Ry. v. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., supra note 21, at 637; City Water Co. of Sedalia v. Sedalia, supra note
21, at 422, 231 S.W. at 945; Suburban Water Co. v. Oakmont, supra note 21, at
252-54, 110 AtI. at 781-82. For a case where a shipper was obligated to continue
shipping by the railroad with which it had contracted although the ICC on its own
motion had increased the rate substantially, see Northern Pac. Ry. v. St. Paul &
Tacoma Lumber Co., supra note 21. Counsel for the Commission conceded that the
contract would remain binding at the new rate, Transcript of Oral Argument, pp.
27-28.
23. FTC REPORT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 145; SAIGH, op. Cit. supra note 9, at
55.
24. FTC
9, at 55.
25. FTC

REPORT,

op. cit. supra note 9, at 133, 145;

SAiGH,

op. cit. supra note

REPORT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 133, 145; SAIGH, op. cit. supra note 9,
at 54; THromAs, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1, 29.
r, 26. SAIGH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 49-54; TiomAs, op. cit. supra note 9, at 30,

